The current visit of Secretary Tim Geithner to Beijing once again shines the spotlight on the Renminbi (RMB) and on demands by US politicians that the People’s Bank of China (the country’s central bank) abandon the peg to the dollar.
Throughout the period 2003-2008, I, as some others, have thought that demands from American politicians of both parties that China loosen the dollar link have been misguided in a number of particulars. They were misguided in thinking that an appreciation of the RMB would, alone, do much to boost US output or employment. The demands were especially misguided in putting such high priority on the entire exchange rate issue, given that we need China’s help on more important things, such as preventing a nuclear-armed North Korea. But my arguments during this period might reasonably have been viewed by non-wonks as quibbles. After all, I did agree, along with a majority of other economists, that an increase in the flexibility of China’s exchange rate would be a good thing.
Now, in 2009, the situation has changed in some important ways. Continued demands from American congressmen that China should stop intervening in foreign exchange market to keep the RMB fixed against the dollar have become especially foolish. This is because of two developments over the last year.
The first development: in mid-2008, the top leaders in China decided to abandon the policy they had followed in 2007 – which had consisted of the long-desired evolution away from the dollar peg and the placing of a substantial weight on the euro. They changed horses in mid-stream: After mid-2008 they returned to their old policy of a fairly close peg to the dollar (similar to 2005-06). Evidently the motivation for the return to the dollar was complaints from Chinese exporters who had lost competitiveness in 2007 as the euro and therefore the new basket appreciated against the dollar. (Barry Naughton, 2008, gives a glimpse inside politburo politics.)
Why, then, are American congressmen wrong to complain that the return of the dollar link has given American firms an additional price disadvantage in world markets? The first reason on the list is that over the last year, the euro (surprisingly) depreciated against the dollar. In other words, at precisely the moment when the RMB jumped back on the dollar horse, the dollar horse and the euro horse changed directions vis-à-vis each other. If the Chinese authorities had kept the (loose) basket policy of 2007 instead of switching back to the dollar peg in 2008, the value of the RMB would be lower today, not higher, and dollar-based producers would be at a more of a competitive disadvantage, not less.
The second development is that, in early 2009, the stratospheric rate of rise of China’s foreign exchange reserves fell abruptly. In some months, the PBoC actually lost reserves. This means that an increase in exchange rate flexibility – in the extreme case, a move to floating – under current conditions might not result in an appreciation of the RMB, and might even result in a depreciation. Again, that does not correspond to what the congressmen actually want, nor to the public opinion that they represent.
In the near future, we could see a return of substantial surpluses on China’s overall balance of payments and a return of the 38-year trend dollar depreciation. In that case, intervention would once again imply suppressing RMB appreciation against the dollar. But that leads us to the third point.
The third development, this spring, is the appearance in the dollar’s garden of the first “red shoots.” Red as in deficits and red as in China. For decades, the United States has been able to count on foreigner investors, and in a pinch foreign central banks more specifically, to buy dollars to finance US current account deficits. In recent years, the PBoC has been the lead facilitator, piling up $2 trillion in reserves, most of it in dollars (the estimate is 70%). Many argued that the United States could continue to enjoy this “exorbitant privilege” indefinitely. But during the past two months we have seen the first signals that this might not continue forever. The possibility that rating agencies might eventually downgrade US debt is in the air, and US longer-term interest rates have finally begun to rise.
The most telling warning shots have come from Chinese officials. Premier Wen in April expressed worry that US Treasury securities would lose value in the future; that required an unprecedented public assurance from President Obama. Then PBoC Governor Zhou in May proposed replacing the dollar as an international currency, with the SDR. Another official told Americans that his countrymen “hate” having to hold a currency that they believe will lose value in the future as it has in the past. Interpreted separately and literally, each of these statements raises interesting economic questions worthy of extended discussion. Taken together, they constitute a simple wake-up call for oblivious Americans. The message is that we are heavily and increasingly dependent on China to buy our treasury securities, at a time when big budget deficits lie in America’s recent past (the big debt that Obama inherited from George W. Bush), in America’s present (the record budget deficits caused by the current recession), and in America’s future (rising medical costs and the retirement of the baby boomers), . If they and other Asian and commodity-exporting countries stop buying our treasuries, the result would almost certainly be a hard landing for the dollar. I define a dollar hard landing as the combination of a big fall in its value together with a big increase in US interest rates. The outcome might be stagflation.
As a general proposition, it is somewhat obtuse to make strident demands on one’s biggest creditor without taking any consideration of the change in the power relationship that debtor status entails. It is especially obtuse to make the demand that the Chinese stop buying dollars, at the same time as we depend on them continuing to buy dollars to finance our deficits. But demanding that they stop buying dollars is precisely what we have been doing for six years, every time we respond to trade concerns by demanding that they stop intervening to prevent the RMB from rising.
Fortunately, Secretary Geithner’s April decision not to declare China guilty of unfair currency manipulation, in Treasury’s semi-annual report, suggests that he understands the subtleties of the situation. Now if those congressmen would just learn some economics…