By now just about everybody agrees that the European bailout of Greece has failed: The debt will have to be restructured. As has been evident for well over a year, it is not possible to think of a plausible combination of Greek budget balance, sovereign risk premium, and economic growth rates that imply anything other than an explosive path for the future ratio of debt to GDP.
There is plenty of blame to go around. But three big mistakes can be attributed to the European leadership. This includes the European Central Bank – surprisingly, in that the ECB has otherwise been the most competent and successful of Europe-wide institutions.
The members of the eurozone and the EU have apparently decided that they must heroically rescue Greece, that this is better than having the IMF do it. Senior figures in Brussels feel that the latter alternative is unthinkable. I am a little confused about why. Martin Wolf writes in the Financial Times this week that to bring in the Fund “would demonstrate that this is not a true union at all.” But the EU and EMU and not true fiscal unions. If the citizens of Germany and other more successful countries were willing to bail out the Greeks, then fine; the EMU would be ready to be a fiscal union. But they are not; so it is not. Given that reality, what is wrong with something that “demonstrates” it?